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check

Frandsen

was properly served with the Colorado summons and complaint:

(11.

32)

Frandsen did not appear or answer the complaint.
On April 7, 1992, the Colorado District Court entered a

default judgment against Frandsen for $25,500, three times the
amount of the dishonored check, plus Court costs and interest. (R.
2)

There was no determination by the Colorado Court as to whether

or not its exercise of personal jurisdiction was proper under the
due process clause.

(R. 2)

On July 14, 1992, Rocky Mountain filed the Colorado default
judgment in the Third Judicial District Court of the State of Utah,
County of Salt Lake.

(R. 4). On March 10, 1993, the appellee,

Frandsen, filed a motion in the Third District Court, on the
grounds that the
the Colorado

attempted exercise of personal jurisdiction by

Court, violated

the due process clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment, and accordingly the Colorado judgment was
void. (R. 18)

Both parties filed legal memoranda and supporting

affidavits.
On April 23, 1993, oral argument relating to Frandsenfs motion
was heard by the Court.

On May 17, 1993, the Honorable Homer F.

Wilkinson entered an order that the Colorado Courtf s attempt to
exercise personal jurisdiction over the appellee, Frandsen, was
violative of the due process clause and accordingly the Colorado
default judgment was vacated.
B.

(R. 94)

Statement of Facts

Plaintiff's claim arises out of a conversation which took
place in Salt Lake City where the appellee, Frandsen, was employed.
In February or March, 1991, David Waldner, President of the
5

plaintiff Rocky Mountain Claim Staking, came to the WRR Industries
office in Salt Lake City and during the course of said visit,
discussions were held between Mr. Waldner and the appellee,
Frandsen, relative to the staking certain mining claims in Idaho.
(R. 29) Mr. Frandsen advised Mr. Waldner that he had no funds to
pay for any staking of the Idaho properties. (R. 29) However, Mr.
Waldner said that he had a cabin in Idaho in the area of the mining
claims and while he was at his cabin he would stake some of the
claims.

(R. 29) The defendant did not contract with, authorize or

agree to pay the plaintiff to stake any of the Idaho mining claims.
(R. 29)
Subsequently the plaintiff advised the appellee, Frandsen that
it had performed staking services in Idaho and demanded payment of
$8,500 for said services.

(R. 29)

Although the defendant had not authorized the staking work,
the plaintiff stated that he had performed the work and the
appellee, Frandsen felt some obligation to pay for it.

In late

July or early August, 1991, Mr. Frandsen mailed to Rocky Mountain
in Colorado an undated check in the amount of $8,500 drawn on a
Salt Lake City bank and advised Rocky Mountain to hold the check
until Frandsen had sufficient funds in his Salt Lake City bank
account.

(R. 29-30)

On or about August 27, 1991, the appellee, Frandsen, advised
Rocky Mountain to date the check August 27, 1991 and to cash the
check. (R. 29-30)

At this time the appellee, Frandsen, had

arranged for a loan in order to have sufficient funds to cover the
6

check; however, the person who had agreed to make the loan to Mr.
Frandsen did not make the loan and there were insufficient funds in
Mr. Frandsen1s bank account to pay the checK.

(R. 30)

On December 16, 1991, the appellee, Frandsen, was served in
the State of Utah, with the Summons and Complaint which the
plaintiff had filed in the District Court of Boulder County, State
of Colorado. (R. 30) The action was brought on the unpaid $8,500
check.

The plaintiff sued for treble damages of $25,500, and a

default judgment in this amount was entered against the appellee,
Frandsen.

(R. 2 and 30)

The defendant has never been a resident of the State of
Colorado. (R. 28) The agreement, if any, was entered into in the
State of Utah and if performed, was performed in the State of
Idaho. (R. 29) The defendant has not conducted any business in the
State of Colorado and did not file an Answer or appear in the
Colorado action. (R. 28-29)

The Colorado Court entered a default

judgment against the appellee, Frandsen.

(R. 2)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Two or three interstate phone calls between the appellee,
Frandsen and Mr. Waldner of the appellant, Rocky Mountain Claim
Staking, and the mailing of a check to Colorado which was not paid
by a Utah bank are not sufficient minimum contacts under the due
process clause to allow the Colorado Court to exercise personal
jurisdiction

over

the

appellee, Frandsen.

Accordingly, the

Colorado default judgment was void and properly vacated by the
District Court.
7

ARGUMENT
I.

A COLORADO JUDGMENT RENDERED WITHOUT JURISDICTION OVER THE
DEFENDANT OR UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH VIOLATE THE DUE PROCESS
CLAUSE IS VOID AND IS NOT ENTITLED TO FULL FAITH AND CREDIT BY
THE UTAH COURTS.
In Data Management Systems, Inc. v. EDP Corp., 709 P.2d 377

(Utah, 1985), the Utah Supreme Court stated:
The Full Faith and Credit Clause does not prevent a
judgment debtor from collaterally attacking a foreign
judgment on the ground of fraud or the want of
jurisdiction or due process of law. Hobelman Motors,
Inc. v. Allred, Utah 685 P.2d 544 (1984);p Van Kleeck
Cremery, Inc. v. Western Frozen Products Co., 24 Utah 2d
63, 465 P.2d 544 (1970).
***

A foreign judgment rendered without jurisdiction over the
defendant or under circumstances which amount to a lack
of due process is not entitled to full faith and credit
in Utah. [Emphasis added].
Id. at 379.
Because the appellee, Frandsen, did not have sufficient
contacts with Colorado to satisfy the due process clause, the
Colorado default judgment entered against the appellee, Frandsen,
is null and void and is not entitled to full faith and credit in
the Courts of the State of Utah.
II.

WHERE THE ISSUE OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION HAS NOT BEEN
DETERMINED BY THE FOREIGN COURT WHICH HAS ENTERED A DEFAULT
JUDGMENT, THE ISSUE MUST BE DETERMINED BY THIS COURT.
The Colorado Court merely entered a default judgment. It did

not take any evidence in person or by affidavit relative to what
contacts, if any, the appellee, Frandsen had with Colorado which
would justify the exercise of personal jurisdiction over him. The
Colorado Court made no determination of this issue. The issue as to
whether or not the appellee, William Frandsen had sufficient
minimum contacts with Colorado to satisfy the due process clause
8

must be decided by this Court.
The Data Management case, supra p. 8, relied upon by the
appellant, did not involve the issue of personal jurisdiction, but
the issue of whether or not the service of process met the
reguirements of due process.

The issue of the validity of the

Wisconsin service of process had been raised by the defendant in
Wisconsin and had been fully and fairly litigated by the Wisconsin
court and, accordingly, the default judgment was given full faith
and credit by the Utah court.
In the instant case, the Colorado Court made no determination
as to whether or not the appellee, Frandsen had sufficient minimum
contacts with Colorado so that the Colorado Court could exercise
personal jurisdiction over the appellee without violating the due
process clause.

This issue is for this Court to decide.

III. THE ISSUE BEFORE THIS COURT IS ONE OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, NOT
AN INTERPRETATION OF THE COLORADO LONG ARM STATUTE.
The

appellee, William

Frandsen, was

not

a

resident of

Colorado. He did no business in Colorado. The oral agreement for
staking services, if any, was made in Salt Lake City, Utah, and the
contract, if performed, was performed by the plaintiff in the State
of Idaho.

The appellee, Frandsen, mailed a $8,500 check drawn on

the West One Bank of Salt Lake City, Utah, to the plaintiff and
advised the plaintiff to hold the check.

He later phoned the

plaintiff and advised him to negotiate the check.

When the check

was presented to the West One Bank it was not paid because of
insufficient funds. The appellee, Frandsen, did not file an answer
or appear in the Colorado Court.
9

Under tiiese circumstances, the

appellee, Frandsen, as a matter of law, was not subject to the
jurisdiction of the Colorado Court because he did not have
sufficient

contacts with Colorado to satisfy the due process

clause; accordingly, the Colorado default judgment entered against
him is null and void and is not entitled to Full Faith and Credit
and cannot be enforced in this state.
The Colorado statute asserts jurisdiction over a person within
the limits of the due process clause, for (a) the transaction of
any business within the state; (2) the commission of a tortious
act; (3) ownership, use or possession of real property and (4)
contracts of insurance.

Colorado Revised Statutes, 13-1-124.

Contrary to the assertion of the appellant, the issue before
the Court is not an interpretation of the Colorado long-arm
statute, but whether or not appellee, Frandsenfs contacts with
Colorado law were sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the due
procedss clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution.

The Colorado decisions cited by the appellant,

although they may be instructive to the Court, are not binding on
this Court on this constitutional issue.

The Colorado Court made

no determination as to whether or not Frandsenf s contacts with
Colorado were sufficient to satisfy the due process clause.
This Court must examine all of the facts and circumstances
relative to Mr. Frandsen1s contacts with Colorado and determine
whether under this particular set of facts, the constitutional
requirements of the due process clause have been satisfied.
The decision of a court of one American state does not
have stare decisis effect in the court of another
10

American state. Such a decision may be considered if it
appears to throw light on the question in issue, but it
will be followed by the court of a sister state only if
the reasoning of the decision is persuasive.
Courts - 20 Am. Jur.2d, Courts, Sec. 203, p. 537.
IV.

THE ATTEMPTED EXERCISE OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION BY THE
COLORADO COURT OVER THE APPELLEE, WILLIAM FRANDSEN, VIOLATES
THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE.
Both Utah and Colorado, pursuant to their long-arm statutes

extend personal jurisdiction to the limits permitted by the due
process clause.

Where this is the case, the only issue to be

decided by the Court is "whether or not the attempted exercise of
jurisdiction offends the due process clause."

Bradford v. Naqle,

763 P.2d 791, 793 (Utah 1988).
In determining whether or not the exercise of jurisdiction by
a Court offends the due process clause, each case must be evaluated
on its own specific facts. This is so because the test is "minimum
contacts" and one minor factual difference can be the determining
factor as to whether or not the test of "minimum contacts" has or
has not been met.

The Court in Pettit v. American Nat. Bank of

Austin, 649 P.2d 525 (Okla., 1982), stated:
It has been recognized that each case involving a minimum
contacts question must be determined on its own facts.
Id. at 528.
Each case must be evaluated on its particular and peculiar
facts to which the Court must apply certain basic constitutional
principles established by the Courts to determine whether or not
due process has been violated.
In Bradford v. Naale, 763 P.2d 791 (1988), the Utah Supreme
Court set forth the principles of due process in relation to a
11

Court's attempted exercise of personal jurisdiction:
Due process required that before a court can exercise
specific personal jurisdiction over a nonresident
defendant, the defendant must have purposefully
established minimum contacts with the forum state.
Indeed, the defendant's conduct and connection with the
forum state must be such that it should reasonably
anticipate being hauled into court there. Once it has
been decided that the defendant purposefully established
such contacts, "these contacts may be considered in light
of other factors to determine whether the assertion of
personal jurisdiction would comport with 'fair play and
substantial justice.'"
This inquiry involves the
interrelationship of the defendant, the forum, and the
litigation.
Id. at 794.
The appellant, in its brief, relies on some Colorado cases
involving promissory notes in which the Colorado Courts have held
that the exercise of personal jurisdiction was appropriate.
indicated

above,

these

cases

are

not

determinative

on

As
the

constitutional issue of due process that is before this Court.
However, even the cases relied on by the appellant do not support
the position that under the facts of this case the attempted
exercise of jurisdiction by a Colorado Court does not violate the
due process clause.
The first Colorado case is Van Schaack & Co. v. District
Court, 538 P.2d 425 (Colo. 1975).

In this particular case, the

Colorado Court allowed jurisdiction to be exercised over a third
party defendant who had issued a letter of credit upon which a
resident of Colorado had relied to extend the performance of a real
estate contract involving real estate in the state of Colorado.
The letter of credit was issued specifically and was relied on
specifically by the plaintiff in agreeing to extend the real estate
12

contract. Under these circumstances, the Colorado Court held that
the third party defendant had sufficient minimum contacts and had
purposely availed himself of the privilege of acting in Colorado
and causing important consequences there.
The case of Tucker v. Vista Financial Corporation, 560 P.2d
453, (Colo. 1979), involved whether or not Colorado would enforce
a

default

resident.

judgment

entered

in California against

a Colorado

The plaintiff, Vista Financial Corporation, brought an

action in California. The defendant, Judith Tucker, had co-signed
a promissory note.

Herbert Tucker had signed the promissory note

in California, and then mailed

the promissory

note

and the

supporting documents from California to Judith Tucker in Colorado.
She signed the documents and the promissory note and then returned
them to the California bank, which then disbursed the funds in
California.

The fact that the documents and the promissory note

had been sent back to California with the expectation that the
California bank would rely on the documents and dispurse funds in
California to Mr. Tucker, was sufficient for the Colorado Court to
hold that the California Court had personal jurisdiction.
In the instant case, the Court must look at the total factual
situation. The contract for staking services was made in Utah; the
staking services were performed in Idaho. Appellee,Frandsen mailed
a check to Colorado drawn on a Utah bank not a Colorado bank. The
check was presented to the Utah bank for payment and was not paid
because of insufficient funds.
In the subsequent case of Panos Inv. Co. v. District Court,
13

662 P.2d 180 (Colo, 1988), the Colorado Supreme Court explained the
rationale of the earlier Van Schaack and Tucker cases.

In the

Panos case, the defendant had executed a guarantee of a promissory
note, which guarantee was to be performed in Colorado.
As to the first element, a guarantee by its very nature
is a purposeful act.
The obligation to which the
guarantee relates is payable in Colorado. Therefore, the
performance or nonperformance of the guarantee in the
event of a default by the makers will cause important
consequences in Colorado. The second prong is satisfied
because the cause of action against Panos Investment
Company arose from the partnership's alleged failure to
honor its guarantee to pay the promissory note in
Colorado, as required by its terms, after the makers
defaulted. Finally, the third element is met because the
guarantee has a substantial connection with Colorado.
Again, the salient fact is that the guaranteed obligation
is payable in Colorado.
It is not unreasonable to
subject a guarantor to the jurisdiction of courts in the
very state where an obligation is specifically payable
when the makers fail to perform their obligations and the
guarantee becomes operable.
Id. at 182-83. [Emphasis added].
The appellant in its brief relies on the Colorado federal
district case of Ruggieri v. General Well Service, Inc., 535
F.Supp. 525 (D. Colo. 1982).

This case actually supports the

position of the appellee, Frandsen.

The Court held that as to

certain fraud claims there were sufficient contacts to allow the
Court to exercise jurisdiction. However, the Court held that there
were

not

sufficient

minimum

contacts

to

justify

personal

jurisdiction on the breach of contract claims. The defendants were
Montana residents.

The Court, in applying Colorado law, stated:

On the breach-of-contract claims, this court may assert
jurisdiction only if the defendants transacted sufficient
business in Colorado connected with the contracts...I
conclude that defendants did not do so. Jurisdiction is
not proper in Colorado merely because one of the parties
to the contract was a Colorado resident. See Automated
14

Quill, 455 F.Supp. at 432. Nor is jurisdiction proper
merely because the defendants received a check drawn on
a Colorado bank. This result is not changed because the
defendants wrote several letters regarding the contract
to the decedent in Colorado. [Emphasis added].
Id. at 535.
In the Ruggieri case, the check was drawn on a Colorado bank.
In the instant case, the dishonored check was drawn on a Utah bank.
The facts in the instant case are similar to the Utah case of
Cate Rental Company, Inc. v. Weyland and Co., 549 P.2d 707 (Utah,
1976) and the Colorado case of Safari Outfitters, Inc. v. Superior
Court, 448 P.2d 783 (Colo. 1968).
In the Cate Rental Company case, the Utah Court held that it
did not have personal jurisdiction of an Idaho resident even though
there had been telephone calls between the plaintiff and the
defendant discussing the rental and purchase of telephone eguipment
on the average of five times a year for the past ten years; the
eguipment was shipped from the plaintiff's offices in Salt Lake
City to Idaho and the defendant sent checks for payment of the
equipment from Idaho to Salt Lake City.
In the instant case, the appellee, Frandsen had even less
contact with Colorado than was involved in the Cate Rental case.
In Safari Outfitters, the Colorado Supreme Court held that
Colorado could not exercise personal jurisdiction over an Illinois
resident. There had been long distance telephone calls between the
Colorado plaintiff and the Illinois defendant which resulted in an
agreement by the defendant to arrange an African safari, as well as
the mailing of a check drawn on a Colorado bank.
Court stated:
15

The Colorado

Nor
do
the
interstate
telephone
conversations,
correspondence, and the receipt in Illinois by petitioner
of checks drawn on a Denver bank by respondent Powers
constitute acts by which the petitioner purposely availed
himself of the privilege of conducting activities within
Colorado, thus invoking the benefits of its laws.
Id. at 785.
The Colorado Court concluded:
Under all of the circumstances disclosed by the record in
this case, it would be a mere fiction to hold that
petitioner had minimal contacts in Colorado sufficient to
meet the due process test so as to enable a Colorado
court to exercise long-arm jurisdiction over him.
Id. at 785.
The appellant essentially argues that any contact with a
foreign state is sufficient to allow its Court to exercise
jurisdiction over a resident of Utah.

This is not the law.

The

Colorado Courts under the Colorado long-arm statute can only assert
jurisdiction within the limits proscribed by the due process
clause.
The foregoing Utah and Colorado cases clearly hold that under
the facts of this case the appellee, Frandsen did not have
sufficient minimum contacts with Colorado to allow it under the due
process clause to exercise personal jurisdiction over the appellee.
CONCLUSION
The appellee, William Frandsen, did not have the minimum
contacts with Colorado which, under the due process clause, would
allow the Colorado Court to exercise personal jurisdiction over
him.

Two or three interstate phone calls and the mailing of a

check to Colorado which was not paid by a Utah bank because of
insufficient funds is not a sufficient basis under the due process
clause for a Colorado Court to exercise personal jurisdiction over
16

the appellee, Frandsen.
Inasmuch as the minimum contacts by the appellee, Frandsen
with Colorado were not present as required by the due process
clause, the

Colorado

default

judgment

against

the appellee,

Frandsen is void, and accordingly the District Court was correct in
vacating the judgment and setting it aside.

The District Court's

decision should be affirmed.
DATED this (g^rh

day of November, 1993.

n 0. Baker
ney for the appellee
liam Frandsen
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FILED IN
Salt

MERLIN 0. BAKER
Attorney for Defendant
William Frandsen
3760 South Highland Drive
Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ROCKY MOUNTAIN CLAIM STAKING
Plaintiff,

ORDER

vs.
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson
WILLIAM

FRANDSEN
Civil No. 926962198 FJ

Defendant.

Defendant Wiliam Frandsen's Motion to Vacate and Set Aside
Plaintiff's Foreign Judgment having come on before the Court for
hearing on April 23, 1993, and the Court having considered the
legal memoranda and the affidavits submitted by the parties, and
having heard the oral arguments of counsel,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, that plaintiff's Colorado judgment is
vacated and set aside.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that the cash bond previously posted
by the defendant with the Clerk of the Court, may be released by
the Clerk to the defendant's attorney.
Dated this / ^

day of May, 1993.

L

EKW\fc\V

I

Homer F. Wilkinson,
District Judge

OOfU

Approved as to form:

fhomas R. Karrenberg
Attorney for judgment assignee,
William Domichel
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to the following:
Thomas R. Karrenberg
THOMAS & KARRENBERG
700 Valley Tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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DISTRICT-COURT, BOULDER COUNtfY^ STATE OP COLORAEJO ^NTOi-^Sfo 1992
CASE NO. 91CV2140, DIVISION 2 ~~~~
_____
^^
SALT LAKE COUNTY

ORDER ENTERING JUDGMENT AGAINST DEFENDANT WI

FRA^DSET't^i^

ROCKY MOUNTAIN CLAIM STAKING,
Plaintiff,

*v

vs.
WILLIAM FRANDSEN,

HOMAF.

Defendant.

THIS MATTER, coming on pursuant to Plaintiff's Verified
Motion for Entry of Default Judgment, pursuant to Rule 55(b),
C.R.C.P., and the Court having reviewed same and various
affidavits filed in accordance with C.R.C.P. Rule 121, Section 114, and it appearing that Defendant was properly served in this
matter, that venue has been considered and is proper and that
good cause exists for the entry of judgment against Defendant
herein, judgment is hereby entered in favor of Plaintiff Rocky
Mountain Claim Staking, a Colorado corporation, and against
Defendant William Frandsen, in the principal amount of
$25,500.00, together with interest of $370.74, court costs of
$92.00, and interest on the entire applicable amount due from the
date of judgment at the applicable legal rate.
Dated this

0

day of

1992.

HONORABLE RICHARD C. MCLEAN
Judge of the District Court

ATTEST: TRUE COPY

\ 1 ;* +'.n,o *-"£ foregoing wer* plzcad
" i ' r Vi. v^-rral Tallinn o~~jc°<z *o
* i pe-'G'.'. or at*orn-/s ir.dxatecf.
Date >A -1 <* ^ Dy fV-~>

ePCW\^)\T

<K~T>

4-13-q^

'

30'Ji.OEftCObNTV, u'-...- ~ . . j

^
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? T A T E OF COLORADO)
• :• y JT i DP BOULDER)

,, s

I
i: E B R A L . GROSSER, C 1 e r k o f t h e D I S T R I C I C 0 U R T o f t h e 2 011 i J u d i c i a 1
D i s t r i c t o f t h e S t a t e o f C o l o r a d o w i t h i n a n d f o r B o u l d e r C o u n t y , do h e r e b y
c e r t i f y t h e f o r e g o i n g t o be a t r u e , p e r f e c t a n d c o m p l e t e c o p y o f
ORDER ENTERING JUDGMENT AGAINST DEFENDANT WII I/IA M FRANDSEN, CASE NUMBER,
91CV2140-2

In Testimony Wher e o f , I have hereunto set my hand a
affixed the seal of sa i d Cou rt, a 1: my office i n
Boulder
JULY 15
; 1 9 92

ofodowiL ,V _(Uxx)djL±

Clerk

STATE OF COLORADO)
COUNTY OF BOULDER)

ss

I,
RICHARD c. MCLEAN
;
, Judge of the DISTRICT COURT of the
20'tf i Judicial District of the State of Colorado within and for the Coun t)
of B o u l d e r , do hereby certify that DEBR..A i
l GROSSER, w h o s e name is
s u b s c r i b e d to t h e f o r e g o i n g C e r t i f i c a t e of A t t e s t a t i o n , n o w is, and w a s , at
the time of signing and sealing t h e s a m e , Clerk of t h e DISTRICT COURT of
Boulder County a f o r e s a i d , and keeper of t h e records and seal thereof, duly
appointed and q u a ! "if ied to o f f i c e ; that full faith and credit are and of
right ought to be g i * en to all h e r official acts as such in all Courts of
Record and e l s e w h e r e ; and that h e r said a t t e s t a t i o n is in d u e form of law
and by the proper of f i • :::: eir
Given under i i i) hand anu . .

jtf£% 15

' ^Qr/a'-^
STATE OF COLORADO)
COUNTY OF BOULDER)

.v be

ss.

I, DEBRA L. CROSSER, Clerk of the DISTRICT COURT of the 20th Judic ial
District of the State of Colorado', w ithin and for Boulder County, do hereby
certify that
RICHARD C. MCLEAN
, , „ _, whose genuine signature
is appended to the foregoing certificate, was, at the time of signing ti te
same, Judge of the DISTRICT COURT of Boulder ., of the State of Colorado,
ju I> c o m m i s s i o n e d a n d q u a l i f i e d that full faith and c r e d i t a r e and of r ig
o u g h t to be given to al 1 I i is/her official acts a s s u c h , i i i a 1 1 Courts o ! '
R e o c r d , ar id e l s e w h e r e .
. In Testi mori) wher 8' ::» f I 1 lav e h e r e u n t o s e t my hand ai i :::!
a f f i x e d t h e s • = a I o f s a i d Co t i r t, a t my o f f i c e Bou1d e i
Colorado,

Clerk
:TriPc«rt.0i*

4/92)

Of i

JULY

i 5

.„

X

19

92,

MERLIN O. BAKER
Attorney for Defendant
William Frandsen
3760 South High]HI
Suite 500
Salt Lake City, .jia'.i i.
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ROCKY MOUNTAIN CLAIM STAKING
Plaintiff,

:
: AFFIDAVIT OF DEFENDANT
WILLIAM FRANDSEN

VS.

Judge Homer F. Wilkinson
WILLIAM FRANDSEN
Civil No. 926962198 FJ
Defendant.

STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
THE PLAINTIFF, WI l.l.l AM FRANDRRN, b*-Mm| first

In I M/MIII im

oath, deposes and says taat:
1.

ie is t.-it^ d e f e n d a n t _

his action and is a resident

S =>" •

2.

Ihat i^iLe i ?13 he has been n resident of the State of

Utah. Affiant has never resided in Colorado or conducted any
•>.

b

3.

That from February, 198 9 until June, 1992, affiant was

employed as a sales representative for WRR Industries, Inc.,
EXHIBIT 1

{

h a v i n g i t s o f f i c e in Salt l i ^ -'ounty, U t a h ,

L'n February W L rsa..,,

Affiant made no

-., D a v i d W a l d n e r , P r e s i d e n t of

p l a i n t i f f R o c k y M o u n t a i n claim R t a k i n r

••

* . +-t, W R R

:.

I

visit, discussions were nei : oetween Mr. Waldner and the affiant
relati "*- * * certain mlninc -lain^ +-M+- *-H- affiant ^ ^ an
i

: .^:.

that he had nc funds to d*
properties.
iQdiiL

•—

,-Jner

any staking <*f ,*.:/ ,c -he Idaho

However, Mr,

'

-> ' *h *

\--

' *

.^i'3 area ^i ...**., J^JftAJ^J.^ ^ I u I M U .iiia ^..a.Xfc! nt. »vub ?.**. n.xo

c a b i n n e w*. :;i

s t a k e s.).;;-.

tli. c l a i m s ,

Affiant **:d not

contract v!+v
any

,
5.

t

m i n i n g t.iuj.ub.

S u b s e q u e n t l y t h e p l a i n t i f f advised the a f f i a n t t h a t it
*

,

l * \

>: •

f

$ 8 , 5 0 C , • ioi L a ; u ^ e i v i c e s .
6

Although affiarc

h=-' r^" *- =»i!+-h^>i7'

t

t-.

obligation to pay foi

•

+-h^ °takinq wrrk
ome

I cite July or - u:ly August, 1991,

affiant mailed *'- +h* * ] a i n t i f f a n u n d a t e d check in the a m o u n t o f
_ ... - L'.it^ bank and advised t h e
plaintiff to hold the check until affiant had sufficient funds in
his bank account,
7

!

n O T a.

,h .

aiiiai.

p l a i n t i f f to d a t e t h e check August
2

advised t h e

. , 1 9 9 1 a n d to c a s h t h e

check

At f his time, affiant had arranged for a loan in order to
• f f :• •'"' >

h a w

*

had agreed i-,: . .

,ac ^uau ;.- ,;..;. a i f i

cii.it.

.- :

KJ. JL

U.

liv^u

• .

ill c i K O

L i i 4_.

^_ ^.y ;.* - i

and there were insufficient funds in affiant s banX account •
pa*
I" .
Uta>

ix December If

-»™i affiant was served in the State of

*'*' *-T- Summons and •-MnpJaint whi -h - k-- plaintiff had

The action was brought on tin unpaid $8,L>GL

*! check.

The plaintiff claimed trnbl° d ^ ' ^ r ^ amount*PO ~ - •* - - 0 n
Copies oi L.

. . ,

...J

.

n

n.

.. _ ..L. ..-. „ „- LAII^

B.

. f.fiant did not .-,;. >; : * ho Complain* , ::_: file an
appearanr -

"'"^t.r:

., ,*.

.

4

*T • v :
v

otuoi

** .

0..1 . ^i ii^aiaer county

entered a DefauJ* Judgment against the affiant a.:.: a judgment ior

copy i i thifc. Defauj t judyfaent i:
'•»•**

•< lc<c»

attached db Exhibit »..

+- *f- plaintiff filed the Default

and n :* Scii* LduLe County, bt.citc .,j LidL

.-ee Exhibj i •*-, i'efauit

Judgment.

Assignment of Judgment, giving notice t ^

- plaintiff, Rocky

Mountain Claim Stakina had n~ld tpd assignee the aforesaid
Defaul

.dgment t

nil ...

-~

:^L,

. .

_:

Notice of Assignment of Judgment is attachec a^ Exhibi•

3

,

FURTHhR kbb I AN"! ,1 1 I'I'll N O T

Dated this

f_

I y of March, 19 93.

William /FrandseiO

'efore me this

Subscribed ai.

i
i
i
L

ETHELYN J. TURNER I
3780 South HJohtand Or.
Salt Lake City.Dish 84106
My Commission
II
August 28,1986
State of Utah
I

My

'ZZA.

y

day of March, 1993,

'sLftZJ/'

lotary
^
Residing at .f?/,j£*

ARTICLE IV
[STATE AND
TERRITORIAL RELATIONS]
Section
1. [Full faith and credit to records and judicial
proceedings of states.]
2. [Privileges and immunities — Fugitives
.from justice and service.]
3 |[ I1!, ^
ill of .states — Rules and regula

tiona respecting the tern:
and property of the
States.]
I [G ,1 aranty of republican form of government
and against invasion.]

Section 1. [Full faith and credit to records and judicial
proceedings of states.]
Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts,
Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may
by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.

e pan t-

t

1
(1) E n g a g i n g in a n y a c t e n u m e r a t e d in t h i s s e c t i o n by a n y p e r s o n , w n e u
not a r e s i d e n t of t h e s t a t e o f C o l o r a d o , e i t h e r in p e r s o n o r by a n a g e n t ,
s u b a i t s s u c h p e r s o n a n d , if a n a t u r a l p e r s o n , h i s p e r s o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e
j u r i s d i c t i o n IICI f ; n e c o u r t s o f 11 11 s s t a t e c o n c e r n i n g a n y c a u s e o f a c t i
i*
from :
(a)

The t r a n s a c t i o n

Clii'l'

The i ( . m i s s i o n

o f n t n r t i o i is a c t w i t h i n

•j|ie

u s e , or p o s s e s s i o n

(r)
i t a te;

ownership,

o f any b u s i n e s s

within

uI

II h i s

state;

this

sta+pf

anv i u ij 1

|i r o p e r t y

situated

ii

I.I i

i:

C o n t r a c t i n g h i i n - u n * my p e r s o n , p r o p e r l y ,
* N i •* ' t a t e J i l l , III II in in Ill IIII i i i i mi of rontracting; or

oi

iii»h

lUbidiny

ui

localud

ntenance of ci Bali iaunial duaicilu within this state with rrnport
issues relating to obligations for support to children and spouse in any
action for dissolution of carriage, legal separation, declaration of invaJ id ity
of aarriage, or support of children if one of the parties of the l a m a g e
continues without interruption I IIII he doairiled within the state.
Clll ') i he engagii ig o I
l " sexual intercourse IIIIIIIIIII I his •ilate as to an act.t>.. bi jujht
i
n
article A or article 6 of title 19, C. R- S- , with respect to a child who
aay have been conceive d tin> « I hi.11 .11 • i f i irit p i rn11r" • r
i • • nf f r n r t h i r *.« ~ * ^ * « H
pet it i o n .

r/i\\fc\r r?

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the

day of November, 1993, a

true and correct copy of the ADDENDUM TO BRIEF n I«'" li'l'UljLUl!;, \ J1"I I.I.I i J 1
FRANDSEN was hand delivered to the following:
Thomas R. Karrenberg
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake Citv. r* .

tyigi.o..-. O ^^^^0

